According to the literature on lobbying, actors gain access to European policymaking in return for information and expertise. It is often assumed that territorial actors will be in a position to provide such information by virtue of being the implementing authorities. By contrast, this article argues that there is a need to examine further to what extent regions are able to use channels of interest representation and to supply information, what kind of channels they use and how they frame their message. For this purpose, it examines the strategies of seven legislative regions in two concrete policy cases. In particular, it argues that the seven regions rely predominantly on mediated channels of interest representation as their capacity and willingness to use unmediated channels of interest representation is limited. Secondly, it argues that regions tend to use technical language over politicized language in lobbying to avoid overt conflict, especially with national governments or other regions from the member state, but that their ability to produce extensive (technical) expertise is also very limited.
Introduction
Since the 1980s, regional governments have become increasingly aware of the impact of European integration and more assertive in European Union (EU) policymaking. On the one hand, this is reflected in the evolution of domestic procedures for coordination in EU affairs in the case of federal and strongly regionalized states. On the other, their level of activism in Brussels -the location of the main EU institution (the European Commission (hereafter 'the Commission', the European Parliament, hereafter 'the Parliament', the Council of Ministers and the European Council) -has increased.
i After the establishment of the first Brussels offices of regions in the 1980s, the number of sub-national representations has grown to 219 (GREENWOOD, 2011, p. 439) . Two thirds of those represent individual subnational governments (MARKS et al., 2002) . In addition, regional lobbying has led to the establishment of new forms of involvement such as the consultative Committee of the Regions and greater access to the Council of Minister. The
Commission's 2001 White Paper on Governance and the increased use of consultations has also opened opportunities for territorial interest representation (KNODT et al., 2011, p. 350) .
The strong presence of regions in Brussels raises a number of questions as to the strategies of interest representation of these regions. On the one hand, regional governments tend to define themselves as institutions of representative democracy that represent legitimate general interests rather than as 'lobbyists', which is a term that can evoke narrower economic or societal interests. On the other hand, they 'can and do become 'lobbyists' for their own distinct interests as public authorities', especially where the costs of implementation or financial benefits are at stake 3 (GREENWOOD, 2011, p. 438) . Thus, regional governments benefit from an informational asymmetry on the European level where understaffed decision-makers -especially in the Commission and European Parliament -are willing to grant access to policy-making in return for information (CHALMERS, 2013, p. 39; QUITTKAT and KOTZIAN, 2011, p. 403) . The challenge for regional authorities is to establish their credibility and gain attention (PRINCEN 2011, p. 931) .
According to the idea that there is a situation of information asymmetry in the European Union, European policy-makers, and especially the Commission, need expertise and political support for policy-formulation. However, demand for information and the willingness and ability to supply information are two different issues (KNODT et al., 2011, p. 355; CHALMERS, 2013, p. 40) . Not all regional governments may have the same capacity to use the same range of channels and provide the same types of information (GREENWOOD, 2011, p. 440) . Thus, in order to shed light on the capacity of regions to engage in EU policy-making, this article will investigate two questions: The first is about the tactics of regions and the second about the type of information that is supplied. In order to answer these questions, the article will focus on seven legislative regions, Scotland, Bavaria, Mecklenburg-West Pomerania, Flanders, Wallonia, Vorarlberg and Carinthia, i.e. cases from the strongest group of regions from a constitutional perspective. These regions may not be representative of the whole spectrum of regions, but they represent a 'best case' scenario for a study focusing on the capacity of regions to become active in EU policy-making. They have implementation and legislative competences in the policy area under investigation and have thus a high degree of legitimacy, an experienced administration, the grass-root knowledge that the Commission needs and a motivation to mobilize (e.g. to preserve their competences). In general, these regions should thus be able to develop and implement particularly ambitious and resource-intensive strategies especially compared weaker regions. These cases thus allow us to see how far regional interest representation can go. At the same time, they represent different levels of economic prosperity and population size, which creates variation in their level of resources and their precise capacity to mobilize (cf. HÖGENAUER, 2013 Finally, all seven regions were active in the domestic coordination of the national position on these policy cases (mediated access), which further demonstrates that all of the regions are, in principle, interested in influencing the policy outcome. This makes the policies also good cases to study the willingness and ability of regions to mobilize in Brussels.
From a methodological point of view, the case studies are reconstructed from qualitative data -36 interviews with officials from all seven regions, their Brussels offices, national ministries and European institutions and ten shorter oral or written exchanges with officials. A full list of interviews is included in the appendix. In addition, speeches, newsletters, press releases and position papers were analyzed 6 where those were available. This methodology supports the aim of the article to analyze the nature of the strategies of interest representation of the regions, as it provides insights not only into the channels that were used, but also into how those channels were used across the whole policy cycle from drafting to implementation (i.e. variation across policy stages) and how the regions framed their message (i.e.
technocratic or politicized).
In terms of structure, the article will first discuss the literature on territorial interest representation and, in particular, the channels of mediated and unmediated access available to the regions in general. The second section will then analyse the findings on the strategies of the regions in the concrete policy cases and analyse them along the lines of the core questions: the extent of the strategies, the choice of tactics (mediated/unmediated) and the politicization of the message. The third section will discuss the implications of these findings for a number of discussions in the literature on multi-level governance and territorial interest representation. Finally, it will conclude by summarizing the core argument that the capacity of regions to engage in extensive lobbying strategies on the European level and to supply certain kinds of information is extremely limited.
The Opportunities for Territorial Interest Representation in a multi-level European Union
Multi-level Venue Shopping
The multi-level governance (MLG) literature argues that the EU is 'a system of continuous negotiation among nested governments at several territorial tierssupranational, national, regional and local -as the result of a broad process of 7 institutional creation and decisional reallocation that has pulled some previously centralised functions of the state up to the supranational level and some down to the local/regional level' (MARKS, 1993, p. 392) . Supranational actors, in particular the Commission, are assumed to engage in alliances with the subnational level that allow both levels to circumvent central governments and strengthens their position in the decision-making process (MARKS et al., 1996; HOOGHE and MARKS, 2001 ).
However, with regard to regions, the enthusiasm of the mid-1990s soon ebbed and was replaced by the recognition that central governments were still the strongest actors and that they may also remain the main point of contact for regions (cf. JEFFERY, 2000; HOOGHE and MARKS, 2001 ).
The literature on interest organizations and multi-level venue shopping, which also draws on a broader application of the MLG literature, asks to what extent the reallocation of competences to the European level has led to a reorientation of strategies of interest representation to the European level, which actors are the target of European strategies and which factors influence such strategies (MARKS et al., 1996; BEYERS, 2002; BEYERS et al., 2008) . Both literatures face the question how national access impacts European level strategies: Are actors that have good access to national policy-makers more or less likely to mobilize at the European level?
There is broad agreement in the MLG literature that constitutional strength has a positive impact on the likelihood of mobilization of a region (MARKS et al., 1996; NIELSEN and SALK, 1998; MARKS et al., 2002; DONAS and BEYERS, 2012 whether an interest group focuses more on one or the other strategy depends to some extent on the organization and resources of the group, e.g. whether they can offer expertise or mobilize people. CHALMERS (2013, pp. 43, 52-4) suggests that the use of multiple tactics works best, as it demonstrates commitment to a position. Most groups do indeed use both strategies simultaneously, but diffuse interests, tend to use outside tactics more and tend to get more access to the EP than to the Commission, whereas specific interests associated with insider tactics tend to have more access to the Commission (BOUWEN, 2004; EISING, 2007; DÜR and MATEO, 2013; CHALMERS, 2013: 49) .
The case study regions could in principle use both strategies: As legislative regions with competences in the policy area they possess a high degree of legitimacy that While the primary concern of the article is to analyse the nature of the strategies of interest representation, differences in strategy are to be expected and need to be explained. Much of the multi-level governance literature (esp. by Marks and Hooghe) relies on implicit or explicit rationalist assumptions, for example about how regions reorient their strategies after governments transfer competences to the European level, or on the reasons why governments transfer competences. Similarly, rationalist assumptions influence part of the Europeanization literature, in the form of the argument that 'misfit' between the European policies and the national policies generates costs and hence pressures for adaptation (cf. BACHE, 2008 , HERITIER, 1996 . This article also follows the rational choice institutionalist assumptions that actors will weigh the costs and benefits of the issue at stake and of the available courses of action within a given institutional framework (cf. HALL and TAYLOR, 1996; PETERS, 2000) . With regard to the matter at hand, two hypotheses can be derived.
Firstly, among the available options, regions will choose the least costly strategy to achieve their goals. As argued below, this will normally be mediated access where the national government takes the lead in the representation of a joint interest.
Unmediated access, and even more so an outside tactic oriented towards the public, will mostly be used when disagreements with the national government make mediated access less effective (cf. HÖGENAUER, 2013) . Secondly, regional governments will only opt for outside tactics in case their primary concerns are political rather than technical in nature. As outside tactics are resource-intensive, it is to be expected that they will only be used for issues that are seen to be particularly salient. In addition, outside tactics that rely on a strong political message and Water Directive, especially in conjunction with political arguments about subsidiarity. As the issues at stake can thus be defined in different ways, the preferences of each region have been defined subjectively, as expressed in interviews and documents.
Of course, in order to understand the strategies of regions on the European level, one first needs to understand the options available to regions. The next two sections will therefore briefly discuss the channels of mediated and unmediated access that are available to the case study regions. Mediated channels of interest representation are all those that depend upon coordination with and approval of the central government. Finally, all regions were represented in Commission committees and expert groups at the implementation stage. In general, the opportunities for regional experts to take the floor were perceived to be much greater, so that regions that were directly represented could to some extent promote their approaches. Those regions are of course Scotland, Flanders and Wallonia, but regional experts from Bavaria and Mecklenburg West-Pomerania also attended specific workshops (Interviews 2, 7, 13, 17, 20, 21, 25, 27) . Scotland also organised a workshop on catchments and flood 
Limited Unmediated Access to the European Level
As the overview in Table 1 Directive. Scotland participated in a seminar in the EP that had been organised by the UK, but otherwise only discussed the Directive with other regions at the margins of the official meetings in Brussels (Interviews 34, 36) . In general, the reliance on mediated access can be explained by the absence of conflict between the national and regional goverments in these cases: the cheapest available means to achieve one's goals was to support the national government in its efforts to represent the common interests (cf. HÖGENAUER, 2013).
Where limited unmediated access was established, the EP was the main target. resolutely opposed to the Directive, used administrators and politicians to support a strategy that emphasised both technical aspects (costs, duplication risks) and political aspects (subsidiarity, regional competences) and that could thus be used to raise the question of legitimacy and address a wider public.
Wallonia had contact with its MEPs for both
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On the administrative level, the Bavaria replied to the Commission consultation in mid-2005  (BAYERISCHES  STAATSMINISTERIUM  FÜR  UMWELT, GESUNDHEIT UND VERBRAUCHERSCHUTZ, 2005). In addition, it took the unusual step of drawing up a cost estimate of the implementation of the Directive and sending this to the Commission. Despite the fact that Bavaria with its 12 million inhabitants is larger than a number of member states and has considerable administrative capacity in EU affairs, the costs of creating such a document were so high that it was the first time ever that Bavaria produced such a document and so far also the last time. In general, this sort of initiative is seen as highly exceptional even amongst large legislative regions as the costs of creating such a document in terms of human resources are regarded as being prohibitively high (Interview 1).
On Overall, the use of unmediated access was thus fairly limited when one considers that the seven regions are among the strongest in Europe and had all mobilized extensively domestically. Given the high level of interest and the comparatively great capacity, one could have expected a much higher level of activism in Brussels.
Instead, only one region took part in the Commission online consultation. Only two out of fourteen cases involved the development of an extensive lobbying strategy consisting of several actions. Only two regions used networks either to present a common concern or as a platform to present individual concerns. The only channel that was used frequently was the briefing of the regions' MEPs. This tactic was used seven times, i.e. in half of the cases.
A Preference for Expertise
The fourteen cases show that there is not just a preference for technical expertise on the demand side, but also on the supply side. In thirteen cases, information was nearly exclusively couched in technical language and focused on feasibility, implementation problems and best practice. The Scottish strategy on bathing water illustrates this well. Scotland had a poor record on bathing water quality, so it used scientific studies that it commissioned to demonstrate that some regions may not be able to improve bathing water significantly, as the problems are not just related to sewage. It then used its signaling system to demonstrate that it is possible to prevent 25 people from bathing when the quality of water deteriorates due to weather conditions. As a result, the Commission was willing to adapt certain aspects of the Directive to take into account the scientific report and the technological opportunities. Similarly, in addition to the political objections, the Bavarian cost estimate helped to illustrate the point that the Flood Risk Management Directive was too ambitious in its original form.
However, the cases also illustrate potential problems in the supply of expertise.
While regions can generally provide some expertise on implementation, a more JEFFERY, 2000) . European level strategies, by contrast, are something that is used for special cases, especially when extensive conflict with the national government occurs (cf. HÖGENAUER, 2013; Interviews 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 18, 22, 24; Written Communication 3).
The Resource Limits of Unmediated Actions at the European Level
Interviewees from smaller regions in particular were aware of the extent to which long-term investments related to the Brussels offices affect a regions general ability to act. On the one hand, some of the small regions feel that they cannot afford a and fishery policy, amongst other things. As Mecklenburg has a long coastline and much agriculture, key initiatives in both of these areas tend to take priority over environmental matters (Interview 30) . It is thus only once we move into larger member-state-sized regions that a better ratio of policy areas to staff solves these dilemmas.
At the same time, effective lobbying at the European level requires corresponding investments at home (Interview 3, 30) . Policy officers in Brussels lack the specialization to follow up policies on their own. As a result, a higher level of staff in Brussels will only lead to better interest representation if the Land has a corresponding capacity to produce expertise (Interview 30).
The impact of capacity can also be seen in the popularity of MEPs in lobbying strategies. Informing the MEPs from the region only requires the region to send an email or call, and especially in the case of MEPs from the same party as the government, the chances of getting a positive response on at least some points are good. No translations are required, the level of expertise that is required is lower than for the Commission and the ties are closer than to Commission officials.
The Myth of a Subnational-Supranational Alliance
The case studies also highlight the problematic treatment of the Commission in the literature on multi-level governance. Many authors see it as both a potential ally of 29 the subnational level against the central government and as an actor who actively encourages regions to engage in European policy-making (ANDERSON, 1996; ANSELL et al., 1997; TÖMMEL, 1998; BENZ, 1998 In particular, policy-specific dynamics play a role in providing a setting for constellations of conflict and alliances. While funding opportunities may facilitate alliances between the regional and European level, the constellations of conflict and alliance are more likely to vary from issue to issue in regulatory policy-making depending on how well a proposal fits the regulatory framework of a region. There is also a high risk of implementation costs and of European initiatives not fitting existing practices in the region. In half the case studies, for instance, there was no conflict between the regions and the central government. Instead, they were joined either in approval of the Commission's intentions (e.g. Austria and the Bathing Water Directive) or in opposition to the policy (e.g. the UK and the Flood Risk Management Directive). European policy-making was thus unlikely to have any impact on the power balance between regional and central governments in these cases. In those cases where conflict did arise, it took various shapes and forms. In the Belgian cases, the regions opted for a common strategy and resolved their disagreements at home. However, even if they had engaged in separate lobbying 30 strategies, it would have been a contest of force between regions. The German case on flood risk management is also quite interesting in that respect. While neither the central government nor the regional governments wanted a highly detailed and costly Directive, some non-German interviewees felt that the regions were more opposed than the federal government (Interviews 27, 29).
On the whole, the potential empowering and disempowering effects of Commission initiatives on federal or highly decentralised states in regulatory policy areas are 
Conclusion: The Central State as Gatekeeper?
On the whole, it appears that for strong legislative regions the "default" approach to regional interest representation in European policy-making is to work through the national delegations, as this is the most cost-effective means of interest representation. Even though in some cases regional representatives mainly acted as observers, the mediated presence at the European level is seen as the extension of regional influence at the national level. As long as a region is satisfied with the national position, it can be a "free rider" and let the central government defend the member state's interest.
While some authors with a focus on structural funds pointed to the opportunities that an alliance between the regions and the Commission presented for regions, 31 regulatory policy-making tends to produce very diverse and fluid constellations of interests. Conflict between national governments and legislative regions appears to be relatively rare, whereas conflict with the Commission is much for frequent. The idea of the alliance against the central state is something of a myth and it could be argued that a central-regional alliance is much more common (TATHAM, 2010).
Genuine unmediated interest representation is less common, and when it occurs it is limited to sporadic acts. Most commonly, legislative regions will contact their MEPs to influence the position of the Parliament. The European Commission is comparatively rarely subject to unmediated lobbying, even though it is the target of regional activity through official channels. Neither the Committee of the Regions nor networks played a major role in interest representation. Overall, unmediated regional activities at the European level are very much supplementary in nature.
Part of the reasons for the limited unmediated activity are the investments required.
Especially smaller regions struggle with the costs of unmediated interest representation, of having a large Brussels office and sustaining lobbying strategies over a longer period of time. But even larger offices do not have the capacity to actively engage in all negotiations. Instead, regions generally focus their resources on a limited number of high priorities.
As a result, the central state is still very much at the heart of every-day representation in European policy-making and in many cases regional-supranational relations are mediated. However, this does not mean that the central government is a gatekeeper who controls the interactions between the subnational and the supranational level.
First of all, in the case of the strongest regions, the Belgian regions, the role of the government in domestic coordination has largely receded to that of a mediator in 32 areas of exclusive regional competences (BURSENS and GEERAERTS, 2006; HÖGENAUER, 2013) . Secondly, to some extent central governments mediate because their regions allow them to mediate. While it is true that this regional choice is to some extent based on resource-constraints and that the regions would not be able to systematically challenge the authority of the central state on a large number of policies simultaneously, they can and do challenge its authority on some policies.
